Introduction
There are occasions when we do not see things for what they are nor remember specific events that we wish we had remembered. When we acquire new knowledge, it interacts with knowledge already stored in long-term memory, and what was already stored influences how we see and remember things. That is, biases are introduced even while perception occurs 1 . We may posit that the old knowledge is stored as concepts and schemas which in turn help make what we perceive meaningful. We do not know what precise mechanisms are involved in the interaction between the new and the old information in the brain but insights into these mechanisms may be gained by comparing meaning systems in the left and right cerebral hemispheres. This is because there are two semantic memory systems, one in each hemisphere, with some overlapping and other non-overlapping information, and they interact in complex ways to achieve unified perception. This view rests on the assumption that in everyday life the hemispheres are exposed to the same external experiences but those are processed asymmetrically, sorted for storage, and later retrieved in ways characteristic of underlying differences in hemispheric semantic memory. The research in my laboratory has focused on this issue.
Thinking of the right hemisphere as having a meaning system, whence meaning of perceived things may be derived, goes against the standard view in neuropsychology. The dominant view is that meanings of things in the physical world are processed only in the left, language hemisphere 2 . Yet, not all things in the world need necessarily have a linguistic code or language-related meaning (e.g., familiar faces, topography of a neighborhood, musical melodies, all functions specialized in the right hemisphere).
Since the normal right hemisphere is language-poor and since pictures can be processed in both hemispheres, we used pictures to probe the hemispheric conceptual organization, that is, the meaning system in each hemisphere. I will start with experiments that use pictures of single objects, ranging from the special case of the human face to exemplars of natural categories.
Pictures of multiple-object scenes will be discussed next. Common, organized scenes will be contrasted with unorganized collections of objects, on the one hand, and with scenes which To find the answers to these questions, two types of pictures were created. One was of a normal face and another was a face-like picture in which the contour frame of a face was drawn but with systematically rearranged facial features inside the frame. That is, a nose was positioned were lips normally occur, an eye was positioned where the nose normally occurs, and so on. These were presented to the left and right hemispheres of split-brain (complete commissurotomy) patients at Caltech in Pasadena using 3, 4 . The contact lens technique (Zlens) for continuous lateralized presentations was used instead of quick tachistoscopic flashes.
Each picture was presented to one hemisphere at a time (through either the left or right visual half-fields) and the patient pointed with the hand ipsilateral to the exposed visual half field to features named by the examiner (e.g., eye, nose, mouth). In these patients, we can determine It is tempting to speculate that on those occasions when we do not see things as they are, when we are exposed to new information which appears to violate standard knowledge and we nevertheless apply conventional models, the conceptual system in the right hemisphere is dominant. With the left hemisphere controlling the manual responses, the actual facial features in the face-like configuration were recognized. Whatever the precise nature of the hemispheric conceptual systems may turn out to be, that in the left appears to be "flexible" while that in the right appears to be "rigid".
B. Exemplars of natural categories
To see if this finding can be generalized, normal subjects were asked to decide whether or not line drawings of single objects were members of natural categories such as furniture, weapon, vegetable, and so on. Some of the exemplars were typical and some were atypical members of the categories (as determined independently by Rosch 6 ) . The pictures were shown in quick flashes in the left or right visual half-fields of normal subjects 7 . The task was to press a button as rapidly as possible to indicate whether or not the seen object was a member of a predesignated category. The results showed different latency patterns in the two visual halffields ( Figure 1 ). In the left visual half-field (right hemisphere), responses were much faster for typical members than for atypical members; there was no difference between typical and atypical exemplars in the right visual half-field (left hemisphere). Importantly, decisions for typical members were faster in the left visual half-field than in the right visual half-field whereas decisions for atypical members were made faster in the right visual half-field 8 .
We see, again, right hemisphere specialization in processing standard or stereotypical concepts whereas there is no effect of typicality in the left. As of now, we do not know how hemispheric control over perception works, that is, how perceptual control is "assigned" to one hemisphere or the other. However, we do know that when the same exemplars were presented 5 in central vision, subjects' decision pattern was identical to the one observed in the left visual half-field. This suggests that the right hemisphere dominated responses in central vision. Note that this is true even for atypical items, where performance in the right visual half-field is actually faster.
Meanings in pictorial scenes
In everyday life, unlike situations encountered in psychology laboratories, we rarely if ever, encounter single objects without a context. Pictorial scenes with common objects may be compared to grammatical sentences where the choice and order of the words in a sentence affects its meaning. The objects in a scene may form a variety of arrangements, including a familiar organization, an incongruous organization, unorganized arrays with non-random collections of objects, and so on. The meaning of each scene, then, could vary as function of the arrangement or particular juxtaposition of the objects, and the extent to which it is remembered could be taken to reflect its meaningfulness. Recognition memory was measured through pointing to the correct answer in multiple-choice arrays. Memory for organized scenes was not different between the two hemisphere-damaged 6 groups, suggesting bilateral representation of schemas showing common object arrangements. On the other hand, memory for unorganized scenes was selectively impaired in patients with left hemisphere damage and this was particularly evident when memory for the whole scene as opposed to its individual objects was measured 11, 12 .
Using the standard logic of inferring normal behavior from brain damage, we conclude that the normal left hemisphere is superior for processing unorganized scenes showing collections of objects. The normal left hemisphere is better in assigning meaning (structure?) even when it is absent. Could it be that when we "see" new meaning where the meaning is not obvious, left cognitive processes are dominant?
Violations of reality in pictures
Another tool for learning about hemispheric conceptual differences are pictures that show incongruous or surrealistic organization of familiar objects. Suppose scenes are created which violate various physical, biological, or social rules (e.g., a giraffe in an Arctic scene, a physician injecting a coffee pot with a needle, a mailbox in a living room). They appear normally organized and they represent common visual experiences except for one detail which renders the whole picture incongruous. When normal subjects were asked to remember such scenes exposed in central vision, and then tested for recognition through exposure of probe pictures in either the left or right visual half-fields, they appeared to remember them better when probes were in the right visual half-field (left hemisphere) than in the left visual half-field (right hemisphere). The left hemisphere appears to tolerate deviations from the accepted rule better than the right hemisphere. it may operate with rigid criteria. This would seem to be a major requirement in a cognitive system that specializes in spatial orientation.
Concluding Remarks
The study of meaning representation in the brain has been examined in the field of clinical neurology for the past 100 years. The approach has been largely through the study of visual object agnosia, the acquired loss of semantic knowledge of previously familiar things, in 8 the absence of sensory or motor deficits, or intellectual deterioration. Visual object agnosia is rare and lesion localization is often bilateral or diffuse. Assuming a unitary, modalitynonspecific central representation of semantic memory, the problem has often been attributed to access rather than to the semantic store itself. However, it is possible to examine the nature of meaning systems in the brain even in the absence of agnosia, as was described here.
The dominant view in neuropsychology fails to consider that the hemispheric "functional division of labor" in terms of language versus non-language reflects but one dimension of hemispheric differences. That is, specialization of language in the left hemisphere and of spatial orientation in the right represent only specific aspects of the general underlying hemispheric meaning systems. Indeed, we have found that there can be two full-blown meaning systems, one in the left and one in the right, which can operate separately and simultaneously in the normal brain. 
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